@article{Curcio2021,
       author = "Curcio, Henry",
       title =  {{Friendship and Partiality: Toward a Theory of Virtue}},
       howpublished = "\url{https://ir.hamilton.edu/do/d95f1d2e-1811-47a3-918d-21f8881871a3}",
       institution = {Hamilton College},
       year = 2021,
       month = feb,
       school = {Philosophy},
}

Creator

Date

February 1st, 2021

Description

We take our friends to be different from others. Unlike the people we pass while walking or acquaintances we have from our work, our friends carry a special sort of value to us. That is to say, we are partial to our friends. This much is seen regularly – maybe when we help our friend who is struggling with work as opposed to any other co-worker. But, what sort of theory supports this claim to partiality? In this paper I will outline a number of accounts, all of which attempt to explain our partiality. I will argue that each of these accounts is lacking and then give my own account of partiality. A distinctly virtue ethical theory of partiality will prove to be best so far as it positively maps onto our intuitions of friendship (especially as a moral phenomenon).

Type of Work

• Research Paper

Institution

Hamilton College

Area of Study

• Philosophy

Advisor

Sponsor

• Levitt Public Affairs Center

Series

Levitt Research Fellows Program

Part of Collection

Levitt Public Affairs Center

Rights Statement

The copyright for this work is held by its creators and Hamilton College. More information